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INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRAIN LIBELS, AND COURTS OF
CRIMINAL EQUITY.

AMONG the Abstracts of Cases which appeared in last
month's issue was one decided by Judge BEATTY ,
United States District Judge for Idaho. The case, which
was determined on the Iith of last July, was that of the
Cceur d'Alene Consolidated and Mining Company v.
Miners' Union of Wardner,1 and grew out of trouble between
the company and its men consequent on a strike. The
miners were more or less riotous; so much so, in fact, that
the Governor on June 4 issued a proclamation stating
"that there now exists in the county of Shochone, State of
Idaho, combinations of men confederating and conspiring
for unlawful purposes . . . such combinations are preventing by force the owners of mines from working and
developing the same, and from employing the persons of
their choice."
It is also, we believe, beyond dispute that
the strikers were not only in possession of the mine for
some time, but that they removed the new employees from
their work and carried them to the borders of Montana,
thus practically drumming them out of the State, and that
at the time the legal proceedings were commenced the
mine owners were practically unable, because of the actions
and threats of the strikers, to run their mines or employ
new men. Setting forth this state of things, the company
came into the District Court asking that an injunction might
be issued restraining the members of the union from further interfering, threatening or molesting its employees or
entering its works. The Court granted the injunction.
This is not the first time that the powers of a Court of
Reported in 51 Fed. Rep., 26o.
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Equity have been used to prevent crime where property is
threatened. In the case of the New York, Lake Erie and
Western R. R. Co. v. Wenger, 1 Judge STONE issued an
injunction restraining the ex-employees of a railroad company from going on the property of the company for the
purpose of preventing freight cars from being moved by nonunion hands. Perhaps the most important case is one in
Massachusetts, where members of a union on strike were
prevented by injunction from intimidating the new workmen by making a demonstration in front of the shop with
banners bearing such inscriptions as: "Lasters are requested to keep away from P. P. Sherry's.
Per order
L. P. U.,, 2 Judge ALLEN says : ", The act of displaying
banners with devices, as means of threats and intimidation
to prevent persons from entering into or continuing in employment of plaintiffs, was injurious to the plaintiffs and
illegal by common law and by statute.' We think the
plaintiffs are not restricted to their remedy by an action at
law, but are entitled to their relief by injunction." There
is also a case in the Circuit Court for the Southern District
of Ohio where the acts on the part of the members of a
union, which were enjoined, consisted in attempting to
"boycott" a publisher for refusing to unionize his office, by
calling on the advertisers in his paper and threatening to
withdraw their patronage, and persuade others to follow
suit, if they continued to advertise in the paper.5 Thus
Judge BEATTY, District Judge of Idaho, had authority and
precedent for his assertion that, "when the attempt to injure
consists of acts or words which will operate to intimidate
and prevent the customers of a party from dealing with, or
'17
Wk. Law. Bul. (Ohio), 306 (1887), Cuyahoga County Court of
Common
Pleas.
2
Sherry v. Perkins, el. al., i47 Mass., 212 (1888).

3

p. 214.
4 Citing Pub. Sts. (Mass.), c. 74, Sec. 2; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass.,

585.
5 Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, el. al., 45 Fed.
Rep., 135 (189i).
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laborers working for him, the courts have with nearly equal
unanimity interposed by injunction." I
With nearly equal unanimity the American courts
have held that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain
a libel. Though the courts have made many practical exceptions, 2 the main principle' is constantly reiterated.
Where property is not affected by the libel, of course there
3
is no question that the Court of Equity has no jurisdiction.
But even where property and business is affected by the
act, if at the same time it is a libel, it will not be enjoined
by a Court of Chancery.4 There are two reasons given for
this refusal to grant an injunction where a libel is concerned. One is that it would interfere with that clause in
all our constitutions which protects the liberty of speech
and the press. The other and far more important reason
is, that it would interfere with the jurisdiction of juries
over questions of libel and slander. We, therefore, have
this curious result: You can restrain a crime when a crime
injures property, but you cannot restrain a libel though a
libel injures property. Surely a jury trial is just as important to one accused of crime as to one sued for libel.
What is the reason for this apparent contradiction? We
think investigation will show that it rests more on the
accident of history than on logic or legal principles.
The rise and progress of the power of the Court of
Chancery to issue injunctions is one of the most interesting,
as it is the most instructive, of legal historical studies. It
is the history, as are all other powers of Chancery, of the
development of law by men who had a stronger sense of
justice between man and man than desire to preserve
I The qualification might have referred to Richter Bros. v. TheJourneymen Tailors Union, 24 Wk. Law Bul. (Ohio), 18g (189o), Franklin County
Common Pleas: Wemight say with absolute unanimity, however, because
in that case no intimidation or threats were alleged, and this is the only
case which would throw any doubt on such an assertion.
'See infra, 796.
8The New York Juvenile Guardian Society v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly
(N. Y.),
188 (1877).
4
Braudreth v. Lance, 8 Paige (N. Y. Ch.), 24 (1839); Richter Bros. v.
Journeymen Tailors Union, supra.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

individual liberty. This was the evil result of the separation of equity and the common law, and the consequent
independent development of equity as a preventive of
wrong, and the common law as a punishment for wrong.
The equity lawyers, disregarding the method by which
wrong should be punished, were, in their efforts to prevent
wrong, constantly trampling on the love of liberty implanted
in the heart of the Anglo-Saxon, which led him to
regard with jealous care the prerogative of a freeman to
have his guilt judged by a jury of his peers. Thus the
Star Chamber, which has been aptly described as a Court of
Criminal Equity, spent its time in issuing orders to persons
forbidding them to commit crime. The popular feeling
against the Court was based, not so much on the fact that
"many new-fangled crimes were invented," as on the objection to the summary manner in which those charged with
contempt of the Court's orders were convicted.
In one direction, however, the minds of the English
people were deeply impressed by the Star Chamber's invention of crimes. So many publications were enjoined and public men protected from criticism by injunctions restraining
so-called libelous publications and those which expressed
opinions, that free speech rapidly became a thing of the
past. And so deeply impressed were the people with the
necessity of preserving the freedom of the press that
impeachment threatened any Lord Chancellor who thereafter had the temerity to restrain a libel by injunction. In fact the issuance of such an injunction by the
notorious SCROGGS was one of the grounds of his impeachment by the House of Commons.I And even as late as I 8io,
when Lord ELLENBOROUGH remarked at the trial of one who
had destroyed a publicly-exhibited and indecent picture,
which libeled the defendant's sister and brother-in-law, that,
"upon an application to the Lord Chancellor, he would
have granted an injunction against its exhibition;" 2 we are
I State
2

Trials (168o), Vol. 8, p. 197.
Du Bost v. Beresford 2 Camb., p. 512.
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informed that the remark "excited great astonishment in
the minds of all the practitioners of the Courts of Equity." 1
Until 1868, in England, as in America, the formula that
equity will not restrain a libel was constantly in the
mouths of the Chancellors. But as in America there has
been no hesitation in restraining threatened crimes, provided they also injured property, which it is the peculiar
province of the Courts of Equity to protect. Thus ViceChancellor MALINS, in Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley,2
issued an injunction restraining the members of a union on
strike from placarding the town with posters asking workmen not to work for their old employer, because he thought
these posters were part of a scheme to intimidate others,
and not simply to persuade persons from seeking to take
their places. And though the particular application of the
rule has been doubted, the principle on which the case rests
has never been questioned. In fact it has been distinctly
made the basis of the principal American cases above
quoted. Property was in danger, and the strong instinct on
the part of the equity lawyer is to protect property. The
consideration that by making a crime a contempt of court
he was treading on the province of juries did not impress
him as it did in the case of a libel, because historically the
Star Chamber had not created crimes which were not
crimes, as they had turned writings which were expressions
of opinion and not libels into libels. It is true that no
Chancellor ever pretended that he had any jurisdiction to
restrain crimes as such. Such an assumption would show
as mistaken conception of equity and as criminal disregard
of individual rights as was exhibited by the framers of the
Iowa legislation, which gives to a Court of Equity power to
restrain the selling of liquor as a nuisance and to punish
the act of Selling as a contempt.' Where a crime will
1
2

One of Howell's Notes in 20 State Trials (issued in i8x6), p. 799.
L. R., 6 Eq., 551 (1868).

I See criticism of Mr. McMurtrie; Art. in Vol. 31 AMURICAN LAw
RGISER AND REvIpw, p. 1, "Equity Jurisdiction as Applied to Crimes
and Misdemeanors."
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affect property, because it is a crime, has not been to the
Equity judges a sufficient reason why they should not interfere by injunction; but, except by one judge, the mere fact
that an act injures property, is said not to be sufficient to warrant an injunction if the act is also a libel. However, if we
examine the growth of the numerous exceptions to this last
statement, we will find, in spite of the inherited prejudice against such injunctions, the chancellors' instinct to
protect property is slowly rendering "meaningless where
property is involved" the statement that equity will not
restrain a libel.
-The first class of exceptions to the rule that equity
will not restrain a libel, is to be found in a case decided in
1742,1 where Lord HARDVICKE restrained the publication of
matter tending to prejudice the minds of the public against
the case of suitors in his Court. - The justice and wisdom
of such an injunction has never been doubted.
The second class of cases is exemplified by the case of
Gee v. Pritchard, 2 where Lord ELDON restrained the
publication of letters not belonging to him who published.
them; thus laying down the rule, that the fact ihat a
document contains a libel on B., cannot be used as an excuse for publishing it by A., if on account of its having
belonged to B., he would otherwise have no right to publish it if it did not contain a libel. Although Lord ELDON
himself questioned the case on the ground that one cannot
be said to have property in letters written by another
person, the particular documents retrained, and.seems only
to have followed the decision of his predecessors on this
point with reluctance, no one has doubted th6 property of
the rule.'
iReprinted in 2 Atk., 469.
Sw. 402 (I818).
See remarks of Lord ELDOx, p. 44r. The cases and authorities
referred to by Lord ELDON in support of the theory that there is a property
in letters, are Pope v. Earl, 2 AtI., 342 (r741); the language in Thompson
v. Stanhope, Anab., 739; Forrester v. Waller, a case decided in 1741, and
cited in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr., 2340 (1769)" cited'also in 2 Bro.,
P. C., p. 138, where under the head of injunctions for printing unpublished
M.SS. without licence are mentioned several cases between 1732 and 1768.
12
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The third exception established is that where one
asserts that his goods are the goods of another, or does
anything which would lead buyers to suppose that suck
is the case, the injured party is entitled to an injunction.
This cannot always be said in strictness to be the case of a
libel. Where the goods sold are better than his whose
goods they are represented to be, there is no libel. The
libel only occurs where the goods are inferior. At first,
however, the jurisdiction to issue an injunction in such a
case was denied. Thus, in Martin v. Wright,' Vice-Chancellor SHADWELL dismissed a motion to restrain one from
exhibiting for money, a picture, purporting to be a picture
of the plaintiff's, whereby he claimed his own sales, were
diminished.' However, in Knott v. Morgan,' an injunctionwas granted to restrain the defendant from running an omnibus, having upon it names and words which formed a colorable combination of the names and words on the omnibusses
of the plaintiff. Thus, advertisements calculated to induce
the public to believe that the work sold was the work of a
rival publisher, have been restrained. 4 Disparagement of
anothers product, in your own advertisement, is legitimate;
but the statement that what you sell is not your own, but
the product of the labor of another and rival producer, is
wrong. It is on this ground that the Court interferes to
prevent one from copying the trade-marks of another.5
Following Martin v. Wright came the case of Clark v.
16 Sim., 297 (1833).

The ground of the denial is not clear. There is some doubt whether
the defendant exhibited the picture as a painting by the plaintiff. He
exhibited it as a diorama, and certainly the plaintiff was not in the
"diorama exhibition business." Had he been, it is said the injunction
would have been granted. CitingPage v. Townsend, 5 Sim., 395 (1832),
a case not directly in point. The Court seems, therefore, to have
regarded the case as that of a man's attempting to sell something as another's, which that other never sold; and, therefore, property or business,
was not injured. It may, however, be injured. (See infra next par.).
3 2 Keen, 213 (1836).
4
Seeley- v. Fisher, Ii Sim., 58I (1841); see also Lord Byron v. Johnson, 2 Mer., 29 (i816).
5
Croft v. Day, 7 Beav., 84 (1843).
2
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IFreeman,I which seems to have decided that where one sells
his products as the products of another, the other is not
entitled to an injunction, no matter how much his business
may be indirectly injured, if he does not, himself, produce
similar articles. I say it seems as if this was the principle
enunciated; though, as its predecessor, Martin v. Wright,
it is not easy to see the exact grounds of the decision. Sir
James Clarke, the plaintiff; was a celebrated specialist in
consumption. Of course, he never was interested in selling
quack medicine, and he attempted, by injunction, to restrain
the defendant, a druggist, from selling pills, entitled "Sir
The Master of the
James Clarke's'Consumption Pills."
Rolls, Lord LANSDALE doubts whether the eminent physician has been injured in his ability to gain a livelihood,
*but he does not leave the reader certain whether he would
hlave still refused the injunction had this not been the case.
Had Dr. Clark been a pill vendor, he says the Court would
have granted the iiijunction. 2 Afterwards it was doubted
whether the injunction should not have been issued on the
ground that the physician had a property in his name.:
But it seems to us that the question of property in the
name is not in point, but rather, if protection of property is
the basis of an injunction, was his property injured or his
ability to gain property impaired by the continued and
-wrongful act'of'the defendants ?
The next class of cases in which an exception is made
to the rule that equity will not restrain a libel, is that an
.injunction will be granted to restrain one from using the
name of another in such a way that the other will be exposed
to civil liabilities, or in other words, render him liable to lose
his property. Thus in Routh v. Webster' the provisional
directors of a joint stock company having, without the
authority of the plaintiff, published a prospectus stating
him to be a trustee of the company, they were restrained
Beav., 112 (1848).
2 p. ii9.
3
Remarks of Lord Cairns in Maxwell v. Hogg, L.R.,
3io, (1867).
IiI

4xo Beav., 561 (1847).

2
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by an injunction. Here we can point out that the difference between this case and that of Sir JAMES CLARK'S, assuming that the physician had his reputation injured by the
pills, seems to us to be immaterial. In one, the ability to
gain property is impaired, in the other, loss of property is
threatened. A distinction which would .enable a court of
equity to stretch forth its arm and ward off threatened danger to property, but render it powerless to protect the means
of acquiring property is too chinmerical long to be tolerated.
The next and last exception arises in relation to property in patents, and is similar to the rule, that an injunction
will be granted to prevent one threatening another man's
employees or customers. You cannot go about asserting
another's patent is invalid, and an infringement of your
own patent, and saying you intend to bring suit against those
who sell 'your rival's goods, provided it is evident you have
no such intention.1
All these cases, however, were treated simply as exceptions to, the general rule that a libel cannot be restrained
it injures property or the means of
in equity even though
2
acquiring property.
Yet a rule of law which would permit an injunction
when the injury to a man's ability to acquire or keep property by falsely saying a ware is of his manufacture when it
is not, and yet which would not allow such an injunction
when the injury resulted from a false statement of fact concerning his business or occupation, is neither founded in
logic or common sense. This was clearly seen by MALINS, Vice-Chancellor, in the much abused case of Dixon
v. Holden.8 A published a notice, which was false, that R
was a partner in a bankrupt firm. B was well known as a
partner in another and solvent firm, and his ability to ac1 Rollins v. Hinks, L. R., 13 Eq., 355 (1872.) This case was not decided until after the case of Dixon v. Holden, but the rule of law enunciated
is now recognized in America, where Dixon v. Holden has always been
repudiated. (See infra 767).
2
See remarks by Lord Chancellor COTTENHAM, in Fleming v. Newton i H. L. C., 363, 377 (1848).
3 L. R. 7 Eq., 480 (1869).
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quire a living would be obviously impaired by the wide
publication of the false statement. The injunction was
granted, on the broad ground that the Court of Equity has
jurisdiction to restrain the publication of any document
tending to the destruction of the property of the plaintiff,
even though the publication of the document is at the same
time a libel. The Vice-Chancellor has been criticised on
both sides of the Atlantic 1 for introducing an entirely new
rule of law, whereas we cannot but think that the exceptions to the doctrine of libel already existing, and which
have been pointed out, would have to be abandoned, or else
the general principle, as recognized by the Vice Chancellor,
would have to be adopted; viz., that whenever property is
threatened by the publication of a document, the fact that
it is a libel will not prevent its publication from being restrained by injunction. The adoption of this principle, for
which Vice-Chancellor MALINS contended, would have the
effect of putting libels and crimes, with respect to injunctions,
on the same footing. Where an act involving a libel or a
crime threatened property, it would be restrained; not
because the act was a libel or a crime, but rather in spite
of its being a crime or libel, and because it threatened
property. And, indeed, as the same reason, why an injunction should not be granted, namely, the interference with the
province of the jury, obtains in both a crime and libel,
and the same reason, viz., the protection of property,
urges the Court to grant an injunction, it seems but right
that both should stand or fall together. And yet, as we
have said, the decisions of Judge MALINS has been
severely criticised on both sides of the Atlantic; while
2
in England, in the case of Prudential Ass. Co. v. Knott,
the Vice-Chancellor's
This last case was an
of a book purporting
business methods and

decision was expressly overruled.
attempt to restrain the publication
to make a false statement about the
financial standing of the company,

I Mulkern v. Ward, 13 Eq., 619 (1872), and cases infra; Kidd v. Horry,
28 Fed. Rep., 773 (i886), infra 767.
2 Io Ch. App., 142 (1875).
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plaintiff seeking the injunction. The Court did not consider whether the statements were true or false, or whether
they would injure the property of the company, but contented themselves with denying their jurisdiction.
There is some doubt whether Dixon v. Holden, or
Prudential Ass. Co. v. Knott expresses the law on the subNOTE a.

v. Horry, 1 thought that legislation in
England had now established the rule of Dixon v. Holden, as opposed
to the rule of the latter case of Prudential Ins. Co. v. Knott, and in support of this view he cites Acts of Parliament and recent English decisions.
In this view we are compelled to believe the late learned jurist was mistaken, though he was undoubtedly correct in assuming that what was
done in Dixon v. Holden, i.e., restrain a libel by injunction, where it
affected property, is done every day by English Courts. The principle
enunciated by Vice-Chancellor MALVINS in Dixon v. Holden, however,
has never been adopted by any other judge. In view of Mr. Justice BRAflLBY'S opinion, it may be of interest to point out bow with the complicated result has been accomplished.
In 1854 Parliament passed the Common Law Procedure Act, the
seventy-ninth section of which runs as follows: "In all cases of breach
of contract or other injury, where the party injured is entitled to maintain and has brought an action, he may in like case or manner as heretofore provided with respect to mandamus, claim a writ of injunction
against the repetition or continuance of such breach of contract or other
injury, or the committal of any breach of contract of like kind arising
2
out of the same contract, or relating to the same property or right"
3
A reference to the subject of mandamus shows that the Court could
issue the injunction only at the conclusion of an action. This defectwas
4
cured by a subsequent section, and it was provided that a writ of injunction could issue at any time after the commencement of an action, proper
security being offered. It may be assumed that this Act did not extend
by one iota the power of injunctions out of Chanceliry, and the jurisdictions to issue injunctions by the Common Law Courts was confined to
two cases: First, where an action had been commenced to prevent the
repetition of the injury complained of before the matter was determined,
and, second, to prevent the repetition of an injury after a jury had determined that the act was an injury. While limited, however, an injunction
could issue under the circumstances above mentioned to restrain a libel
5
trespass or any other act. This was the state of the law at the time of
Nixon v. Holden, and it was also probably the state of the law at the time
of arguing the case of Prudential Ins. Co. v. Knott, which was decided
1 28 Fed. Rep., 773 (1886).
2 17 & I8 Vict. chapter 125, 79, P. 442.
3Id.
&
68-72.
' Id. ?.82.
5 Saxby v. Esterbrook, L. R. 3 C. P. D., 339 (1878); Shaw et at.
Earl of Jersey L. R., 4 C. P. D., 120 (1879)Mr. Justice

BRADLEY, in Kidd

EDITORIAL NOTES.

ject as it exists in England to-day, the question having been
complicated and obscured by legislation. Leaving the
explanation of the effect of this legislation and the present
condition of the law in England to a note,a we will pass on
January 20, 1875, but on the 2d day of November, 1874, the Supreme
Court of Judicature Act went into effect. This Act, after consolidating
the several Courts into the High Court of Justice, proceeds in one of its
clauses as follows :1 "A mandamus or injunction may be granted or a
receiver appointed by an interlocutoiyorderof the Court in all cases in
which it shall appear to the Court to be just or convenient that such order
should be made." It resulted from this section that any Court sitting as
a Court of Equity could restrain, until the final hearing of an action, any
act which] they saw fit.2 It is evident that the Act gave the Court of
Equity the power to issue an injunction as an interlocutory order whenever they thought proper. They could, therefore, on an interlocutory
application restrain a libel. And if a suit was brought for damages on
account of a libel, at the same time the plaintiff could apply for a temporary injunction restraining further publication, and on the termination
of the suit in his favor, could secure a permanent injunction against the
repetition of the injury. But the Acts did not give to Courts of Chancery
any new power to grant injunctions in a simple application for an injunction, not as an accompaniment of a suit or a proceeding in the Courts of
Chancery. On an application for an injunction it would not be granted
to-day, if it could not be granted before the Acts. The case of Day v.
Brownrigg s shows that there was no difference in the principle on which
a court grants injunctions made by the JudicatureAct. The case of the
Prudential Ass. Co. v. Knott has never been overruled. The cases which
have been supposed by the judiciary of this country to overrule that decision are totally distinct. The mistake on the part of American Bench
and Bar arises from the language of the Syllabus in Thorley's Cattle Food
Co. z. Massam 4 and also from the language of Vice-Chancellor MALINS.
The Court of Chancery had just decided that the goods of the two
contending parties were made from the same receipt, and that neither
had an exclusive right to the process.5 The Vice-Chancellor decided that
after that decision had been made, he would entertain, and if proper issue
an injunction restraining one party from asserting that his was the only
true article, and all others were imitations. The Vice-Chancellor only
136 & 37 Vict., ch. 66,

25, sub. 8: L. R. 8. State 321.

2 Beddow v. Beddow, L. R., 9 Ch., Div. 89 (1878).
3 L. R. io Ch., Div. 294 (1878).

4 L. R., 6 Ch., Div. 582 (1877).
5
Massam v. J. W. Thorley's Cattle Food Co., L. R. 6 Ch. Div., 574
(1877). This decision in as far as the court determined the products were
made from the same receipt was confirmed, but in other respects it was
reversed. Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Co., L. R. I4, Ch. Div., 748

(r88o).
5'
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to our American exceptions to the rule that a libel cannot
be restrained in equity.
Of course there is no doubt but that where literary or
other property exists in the publications, though it also happens to be a libel, it will be restrained, or that one will be
restrained who sells his own goods as the goods of another,
.refused the injunction because the need for it was not clearly made out. In
other words a right had bedn determined by a court and an injunction
was asked to restrain its violation. It would have been perhaps
a stretch of the Act to issue the injunction, provided we assume that such
ati injunction could not issue before the Act. However, the power to
issue the injunction was certainly given by the spirit of the Judiciary
Act if not by the letter. The spirit of that Act and the Act of 1854 being
to enable a court of law which had once determined that the acts of one
party were any injury to another to prevent their repetition. And, therefore, when in i88o the Court of Appeals had stated it, as its opinion also,
that the two products were made from the same receipt,1 and one party still
continued to send round advertisements falsely stating that they only
held the true receipt, Vice-Chancellor MALINS issued a permanent
injunction restriining the further publication of the advertisements
making the false statements, and this action on his part was upheld by
the Court of Appeals.
The two other cases cited by American judges as proving that the
English courts have repudiated in toto the old doctrine that equity will
not interfere to restrain the publication of a libel, are Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co. v. Beall, 3 and Loog v. Bean. 4 But on inspection we find that they are both cases of an interlocutory injunction
pending the hearing of the case on the merits, and in the first, as a matter of fact, the injunction was refused. In the second case the injunction
was granted.
We are forced, therefore, to the opinion that the late Mr. Justice
BRADLEY was mistaken, when he says: that the Prudential Life InsCo. v. Knott, has been overruled in England, and the rule of ViceChancellor MALINS, in Dixon v. Holden, that where property was
injured though by a libel, equity would interfere by injunction, has been
adopted in consequence of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, and
the Judicature Act of 1873. Practically, it is true, a man, as a consequence of these Acts, can always have a libel restrained by injunction.
He can bring his action, procure a temporary injunction, and then, if
the case is decided in his favor, a permanent injunction. Consequently,
we may never have the question of Dixon v. Holden, or Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Knott, raised in an English Court, and which case would be
followed will always remain a debatable question.
I Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Co., L. R., 14 Ch., Div. 748
2Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, L. R., 14 Ch. Div., 763, (iSSo).
3 L. R., 20 Ch. Div., 5o (1882).
4 L. R., 26 Ch. Div., 3o6 (1884).
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though on account of the goods sold being of inferior
quality there may be a libel in the represention. And,
although we do not find any case on the subject, we cannot
but believe that courts which would restrain a man from
hurting another's business by selling inferior goods as the
goods of that other, would also restrain him from selling
goods in another's name, which, on account of their
character, 'hurt that other's business, thereby depriving him
of the means of acquiring property.
The jurisdiction to restrain one man from threatening
to sue the customers of another who sell articles which
he alleged are infringements of a patent held by him,
where it is shown that he has no such intention, was until
lately in doubt. Thus Mr. Justice BRADLEY, in Kidd v.
Horry,' denied his power to issue an injunction to restrain
the defendants from threatening to sue the purchasers of a
rival patented article, though it does not appear whether
the threat was bona fide or not. However, he criticises a
New York case,2 where the threat was not bona fide and
where the injunction had been issued, and it is fair. to presume that he would have denied his right to issue the injunction, even if it had been shown that there did not exist
on the part of the defendant any intention to sue the customers of the plaintiff Judge CARPENTER, of the Circuit
Court for the District of Massachusetts, in Balto. Car Wheel
Co. v. Bemies,2 followed Mr. Justice BRADLEY, but when
the case of a man threatening to sue another's customers for
infringement of patent, when he had no intention of doing
so, came fairly before a Federal Court, the injunction was
granted.' Our Courts, however, still repudiate their power
to issue an injunction to restrain false statements concerning
another's business, whether those statements are assertions
that a patent is invalid,' or that trade-marks are being in128 Fed. Rep., 773 (1886).
2

P. 776, the case of Croft v. Richardson, 59 How Pr., 356 (x88o).
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4Emack v. Kane (C. Court N. D., Ill.), 34 Fed. Rep., 46 (1888).
5
Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass., 69 (1873).
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fringed,' or that a company is insolvent, ' that a manufacturer employ's "scab" labor,' statements about a man's
life tending to injure his business,' or a false statement
that Company A and not Company B has received a prize
at a State fair.'
We do not wish, for a moment, to be considered as
contending that an injunction should have been issued in
all these cases, but simply to point out that there is no
valid reason why an act, which injures property, should
not be restrained, although it is also a libel, when an act,
which is b crime, is restrained if it injures property. All
acts, which injure property, are not restrained in equity.
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to cases where,
unless it interfered, irreparable injury to the property would
result. Why in such case the protecting power of the Court
should be withheld simply because the act which injures
consists in words is not clear to the writer. It is true, the
liberty of the press is sacred. Let us hope it will always
remain so; but it is the liberty to express and write freely
our opinion. The liberty which would allow a man to
ruin beyond repair the property of his neighbor, by circulating false statements of facts, is the liberty of anarchy,
and not of civilized society. Surely an action which can
prevent the unlawful injury to property is to be commended. The liberties of a people are not threatened by
injunctions seeking to prevent unlawful acts, but by the
trial of the fact, whether the act forbidden has been committed, by a judge, ex h3arle, and without a jury. This
is a real danger, but it will not be averted by allowing
injunctions to issue to restrain crimes and not libels.
Such a position being illogical will result in one of
two results equally to be deplored-either the practice
IManger Agt.

Dick., 55 How. (N. Y. Pr.), 132 (1878).
Life Assn. v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App., 173 (1876).
3
Richter Bros. v. The Journeymen Tailors' Union, 24 Wk. Bul. (Ohio
Com. Pleas, Franklin Co.), 189, (189o).
' Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige (N. Y. Ch.), 24 (1839).
5The Singer Mfg. Co. v. Domestic Sewing Machine Co., 49 Ga., 70
(1872).
2
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of issuing injunctions to restrain crimes where they also
injure property will be abandoned, and a useful function
of the Court lost, or the practice being continued,
acts, which really amount to a crime, will be tried by a
judge without a jury.' This state of facts it seems to us
would warrant the interference of a Legislature, to harmonize
the principles of equity with the safe guards which the
common law as hedged around the conviction and punishment for crime. Had the two systems been developed
from the beginning by the same men, an injunction would
have probably been issued, whenever irreparable damage to
property was threatened, but the fact whether, the injunction had been disregarded, if the act also amounted to a
crime or a libel, would, at the request of the accused, be
submitted to a jury. Why not adopt this method now?
By doing so, the beneficial workings of an injunction would
be retained, and yet crimes and libels would still be
W.D.L.
within the province of juries.
WITH this number THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
AND REVIEW presents to its readers the first installment of
the annotations written and edited in pursuance of the plan
outlined in the August number of this periodical. The
plan, briefly stated, contemplates the publication of about
sixty annotations a year upon important cases recently
decided by the courts. These cases and the annotations appended to them deal with problems drawn from
various branches of the law, and they are selected in such
a way as to lay before our readers briefs upon constantly
recurring questions of great importance to the lawyer in
the active practice of his profession. Each of the departments into which the field of law has been divided
is presided over by an eminent specialist *ho will super'The case of U. S. v. Kane, 23 Fed. Rep., 748 (1885), while the course
of Justice BRZWER was perfectly consistent with precedent, is an example
of crimes being condemed by a judge without a verdict of a jury. The
case has a "false ring" in the ears of an Anglo-Saxon, and serves as a
warning as to what may happen if one is charged with disregarding
injunctions restraining crime.
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vise the work of his assistants and edit every annotation that appears. The assistants themselves are law
yers in active practice at the bars of the largest cities of
Union, whose services we have been able to secure by reason of their particular interest in the branch of law upon
which their work will be done.
By a reference to the annotations, which appear elsewhere, it will be seen that in all cases where a mere syllabus is a sufficient presentation of the case, no more extended
statement of the facts is made, and in no case will opinions
be printed in full. But in some instance (as, for example,
in the case of Mullen v. Doyle) the purpose of the annotation cannot be accomplished without a brief statement of
facts and a short abstract of the opinion of the Court. In
such cases it has been thought well to preserve the usual
form of case-reporting, including the insertion of the names
of counsel.
It must not to be forgotten that it is part of this annotation scheme to publish from time to time monographs
upon legal topics of great interest and importance, each
monograph being the work of an assistant in the department to which the subject of the monograph belongs.
These monographs will be published in book form by the
University of Pennsylvania Press, and it is fair to predict
for the rest of the series a large sale, which has been realized in the case of the three monographs already issued.

It is hoped that the readers of the AMERICAN LAW
REVIEW will appreciate the importance of

REGISTER AND

an enterprise which furnishes to them, in convenient and
accessible form, sixty elaborate briefs in a single year,
fresh from the pens of lawyers whose especial attention is
given to the subject of which they treat and prepared under
the eye of those than whom none are more eminent in the
branch of law over which they preside.
G. W. P.

